A New Chapter in the Chagos Archipelago Dispute

Editorial

On October 3, 2024, the governments of the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom announced a historic political agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago, including the strategically significant Diego Garcia. This agreement, which partially resolves the decades-long dispute over sovereignty, was the subject of a joint statement by the British and Mauritian Prime Ministers.

There is no doubt that this is a milestone, achieved after years of sustained efforts, lobbying, and diplomatic pressure by successive Mauritian governments since independence, bolstered by support from the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Union, and other Global South nations. Mauritius had already made significant strides in 2019, when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion stating that the UK should relinquish control of the islands, acknowledging that the forced displacement of the Chagossian population in the 1970s to make way for a U.S. military base had been wrongful. This victory was the result of a bold decision by former Prime Minister Sir Anerood Jugnauth to bring the case before the ICJ and, later, a crucial vote at the UNGA which Mauritian diplomacy won against intensive lobbying from the UK. Additionally, former Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam deserves credit for challenging the UK’s creation of a Marine Protected Area around the Chagos Islands in 2010 before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg – an initiative that would open the way for further legal challenges at the international level.

There is now a new geopolitical landscape in this part of the world, and a new player in the Chagos imbroglio and the broader great power competition in the Indian Ocean: India. Once seen as opposed to the U.S. presence in Diego Garcia, India is now a member of the Quad and is perceived as a close ally of the U.S., largely due to its heightened threat perceptions of China in the Indian Ocean. India is also viewed as “a key enabler for U.S. strategic and operational interests” in the region, and its role as a facilitator in resolving the Chagos sovereignty and the Diego naval US base issues seems evident. This may explain the joint statement’s reference to India’s “full support and assistance” in reaching the political agreement between the UK and Mauritius. What all this means is that the conditions have today been set for resolving, albeit partly this long-standing dispute between Mauritius and the UK.

However, the complexities and nuances of the agreement cannot be overlooked. While the joint statement presents a promising vision of cooperation and mutual respect, the recognition of Mauritius’s sovereignty over the whole of the Chagos Archipelago is a significant concession by the UK, which has long controlled the islands. Yet, the framework of the agreement introduces a 99-year period during which the UK exercises Mauritian sovereignty rights over Diego Garcia, the site of one of the most important U.S. military bases. This dual arrangement raises fundamental questions about the balance between Mauritian sovereignty and the strategic interests of the UK and US in the region. It also circumvents, neatly some might say, the need for a formal lease agreement for the UK/US naval base of Diego but makes reference to some form of financial compensation. As the joint statement explains: “For an initial period of 99 years, the United Kingdom will be authorised to exercise with respect to Diego Garcia the sovereign rights and authorities of Mauritius required to ensure the continued operation of the base well into the next century.” In practice, this means that while Mauritius will technically hold sovereignty over Diego Garcia, the UK will continue to manage and control the island and its military operations as if it were its own territory for the duration of the agreement. Jurists will ponder why a formal lease between sovereign Mauritius and the UK/US base at Diego has been side-stepped but this delicate balance between formal sovereignty and practical control over such a strategically important location is a core complexity of the deal.

Another significant aspect of the agreement is the commitment to addressing the historical injustices faced by the Chagossians. The establishment of a UK-administered trust fund for the welfare of the Chagossian community and plans for resettlement programs reflect an acknowledgment of past wrongs. However, the success of these initiatives depends on the sincerity of implementation and sustained support from the UK. The promises made need to be fulfilled with genuine commitment, resources, and long-term planning to ensure the welfare of the Chagossians and the restoration of their rights.

As the UK sets out at last to recognise its legal misdeeds following the illegal excision and deportation of Chagossians, there is no mention of retroactive compensation either of the latter, wherever they and their descendants may now be scattered, nor the cumulative deprivation of Mauritius sovereign fishing and other rights for over half a century. In addition, the revival of the notorious Marine Protected Area which the UK had unilaterally established and was condemned at the UNCLOS in 2010, raises intriguing questions on our sovereign access or travel to our Chagos islands without having to seek UK authorisation.

Moreover, the economic partnership established by the agreement includes a UK pledge of financial support and infrastructure development, which could positively impact Mauritius’s economy. However, this raises concerns about potential dependency and external influence on domestic policies. No mention is made whether the Diego naval base will henceforth employ Chagossians or Mauritians in general, nor whether supplies would be sourced from here. The real challenge will be in ensuring that this partnership remains mutually beneficial, without compromising Mauritius’s autonomy or economic stability.

Finally, it is important to note that the “political agreement” between the UK and Mauritius is still subject to the finalisation of a treaty and supporting legal instruments. Both sides have expressed their intent to complete this process as quickly as possible, but this raises an important question: is a caretaker government in Mauritius, during the interim period before a duly elected government takes office, empowered to enter into a treaty with a foreign power — no matter how friendly — that will bind the country for another 99 years? This issue warrants serious consideration and further scrutiny before any final agreement is signed.

In conclusion, while this agreement marks a significant step forward in resolving the Chagos dispute, its implementation and the delicate balancing of strategic, legal, and moral considerations will be the true test of its success.

Mauritius Times ePaper Friday 4 October 2024